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court in England as between a Yankee Probate Court and the
Court of Arches, but our simple device has commended itself to
the learned lawyers charged with the preparation of their new
bill.
There are some provisions in the proposed English Act which
are new, and are decided improvements on any other English system, but which are not well adapted to the circumstances of this
country. These also seem to be encumbered with a machinery
which must prove dilatory and expensive in operation, and the
bill was recommitted to the committee for modification in these
respects and to report at the session to be held during the present
month (February 1868). It is expected that the bill will then be
brought before the House of Commons by the Attorney-General,
and some explanation of its history and composition may be expected in his opening speech.
J. A. J.

RECENT AMERICAN

DECISIONS.

United States Circuit Court, Northern -Districtof Ohio. Jan.
uary Term, 1868.
JEREMIAH ENSWORTH v. THE NEW YORK LIFE INSURANCE CO.
In a suit brought in assumpsit for breach of a contract between an insurance
agent and his insurance company, by which it was agreed that he should receive a
percentage on all renewals of policies procured by him as long as such policies
remain in force: Held, that the action may be sustained as upon a contract indivisible, and testimony will be admitted to show the probable expectancy of the duration of such policies.
An established custom among insurance companies as to an agent's property in
lists of policies procured by him may be introduced to explain such contract.

Tn plaintiff brought his action in a state court, from which
the defendant, The New York Life Insurance Company, caused
the same to be removed, under the provisions of the Act of 1789,
to the Circuit Court of the United States.
The plaintiff was in 1861 appointed defendant's agent at Cleveland, Ohio, and an agreement made by which he was to receive
10 per cent. on first premiums, on policies procured by him, and
5 per cent. on the renewal premiums, as long as such policies
should remain in force. In February 1865, the plaintiff was dis-
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missed from the agency, on the ground'that he engaged in procuring policies for another company, although there was nothing in
his agreement, or acceptance of the agency, which specifically
forbade his doing this. During his agency he had procured fifty
policies, a majority of which were for the lives of the insured,
and the remainder required premiums to be paid for ten years.
Some had expired by forfeiture, or by the death of the insured.
Upon the termination' of the agency the collection of the renewal
premiums was taken away from the plaintiff, against his consent,
and given to his successor. It was. shown that the probable
expectancy of the life of- the policies so procured would be from
eight to thirteen years; and taking all the contingencies of forfeitures and deaths into consideration, they would remain in force
an average of at least ten years. Also, that a custom prevailed
among insurance companies and agents, by which agents acquired
a property in lists of policies procured by'them.
Plaintiff claimed that th withdrawal of the collection of such
premiums on renewals from him, was a breach of the' contract by
which he had suffered damages to the amount of $2337.
Wyman& Barlow, for plaifitiff, argued that the damages arising
from the breach of contract are definite and immediate ; are a
subject of mathematical calculation ; -that the list of policies procured by the. agent has an intrinsic and market value, and that
his damages in consequence of the breach are recoverable at*
once ; and cited 2 Black 590 ; 31 Verm. 582 ; 3 Parsons 189.
F. J. Dickman and S. Je. Andrews, for defendant, claimed
the forfeiture by the plaintiff of his right to commissions under
the contract by misconduct; that the comissions on renewal
premiums to be paid in future, could not be considered in measuring damages; and that actions must be brought yearly for the
futre commissions.
SHERMAN, J., after reciting the contract, and instructing as to
the general weighing of testimony, charged the jury :-That if an
agent should grossly misconduct himself in the course of his
agency, and should prove unfaithful to his trust, he would forfeit
his claim to his compensation or commission-but his misconduct
and infidelity must be gross and aggravated before such consequences would follow: ordinary or slight misconduct would not
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work a forfeiture of his commissions, although it might be a good
cause for a revocation of his agency.
In this case the contract is claimed by the plaintiff to be an
entire contract, and that there may be an entire breach ; that the
damages can be readily ascertained from well-known principles
derived from long-used life tables. On the other side, it is
claimed to be a divisible contract, and that the breach can be
severed into several parts; I know of no general rule of law that
would absolutely and definitely determine into which class this
particular case would fall, nor can any adjudicated case, similar
in all respects to this, be found. If any existed, it would undoubtedly have been found by the learning and research of the
counsel. This contract may be said to be a continuing contract;
but whether it is an entire or divisible contract depends upon its
terms. When a contract is made for the building of-a house, and
a party refuses to fulfil, it may be considered an entire contract;"
and one refusal may properly be treated as an absolute breach,
and one suit may cover all the damages. On the other hand, a
contract to deliver the crops of a farm for several successive
years is one .capable of division, and. several actions may be
brought each year for the refusal to deliver the crops.
Again, it has been held and decided, that a continuing contract
to pay a sum of money by instalments, or the hire of a laborer
by the month for &whole year, is a divisible contract, and may
be sued on from month to month, or when the instalments become
due and payable. On the other hand,'it is well settled that a
contract to board, clothe, and support old people during their
lives, is one entire contract; and one suit may be brought for the
whole damages sustained, by a breach. The principle deduced.
from these cases is, that if a contract is formed of parts which
are so far inseparable, that if any one is taken away there is a
completed and final breach, then all must be included in the damages; but if the contract is such that it can be separated and
divided into one or more distinct and separate breaches, then an
action will lie and damages be had for those breaches.
If it be found from the evidence that this contract contemplate4
that the plaintiff should have the absolute right and ownership in
the policies obtained by him, to the extent of five per centum on
their renewals during the life of them, and that this right became
fixed at the moment and could not be divided from other"duties
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and other matters ; then it is one entire contract, and you must
find and fix his damages from the evidence given as to the value
of such an interest in the policies. But if the contract contemplated that he was entitled to the commissions on the premiums,
only as the policies were renewed from, year to year and the premiums paid to the life insurance company, then the contract is
divisible, and he can only sue and recover damages after those
premiums for renewals are paid in. In this case the plaintiff
would be entitled to recover the amount of the commissions on the
renewals only down to the day on which he brought his suit.
In this connection, it may be said that a well-established custom
among life insurance companies and their agents, as to the kind
and extent of property that agents- may possess in the lists of policies they procure, may be considered as explaining the contract
as claimed, because the parties are presumed to make the contract
in reference to that custom.
The verdict rendered was for the plaintiff, damages $1000,
which was the full value of the commissions on the renewal premiums-.to become due during their estimated probable lifetime,
after deducting the costs of collection.
The business of life insurance has
within a few years past assumed such
surprising dimensions, and the custom
of compensating lgents by commissions
on thepremiums obtained has become so
general, that the foregoing; although
only a nisi prius case, will bebreceived
with interest by the profession as one of
first impression, but quite likely to arise
frequently hereafter.
A similar state of facts existed in the
case of Machette v. New England Mutual
Life Ins. Co., reported in the Philadelphia Legal Intelligencer for Mlay 3d,
1867, though the questions raised were
different.
In that case the plaintiff
Machette claimed to have a contract as
agent of the defendant company for a
certain percentage on original and renewal premiums, and also that he was
"Cto have the right to collect every such
renewal premium, and remit the same to
the company, after deducting the said

compensation;"
The defendant company sent notices to policy holders whose
insurance had been procured by plaintiff,
that he was no longer an agent or the
company, and requiring future renewal
premiums to be paid to another person,
whereupon plaintiff filed a bill in equity
in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia to enjoin thEadefendants "from
interfering with the complainant in colrecting the renewal premiums until adequate security is gven for the commissions to which complainant is entitled."
An answer was put in by defendants,
denying substantially all the equities of
the plaintiff's bill, and the injunction.
was therefore refused ; but the court
went' further, and expressed its opiniox
that even on the.plaintiff's own case, his
right to commissions, and his authority
to collect the premiums, were distinct
and independent privileges, and that
while the company could do no act to'
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deprive him of his right to the former, briefly, with special reference to emyet they might revoke his authority for ployees discharged before the end of the
the latter,
term for which engaged, in the note to
The subject of entire and divisible Huntingtonv. Railroad Co., ante p. 147
contracts, treated somewhat in the prinIT. T. M.
cipal case, will be found discussed

Supreme Court of Iowa.
MORRISON AND STARTSMAN v. MARQUARDT ET AL.
There may be a dedication of land to public use by parol; but the intent to
dedicate should in such case be clearly shown.
The sufficiency of evidence to establish a dedication discussed.
The English doctrine that there may be a grant of light and air by implication
is not applicable to the situation and condition of this country. Per DILoN, C. J.
The English rule is this: If a man sells a house with windows and doors
opening on to hig vacant ground, neither he nor his grantee can afterwairds build
upon such vacant ground so as to obstruct the flow of light and air without express
reservationof the right to do so: Held, that if such a rule should be recognised in
this country, it should be applied only in cases where the circumstances make it
clear that such must have been the intention of the parties.
The nature of the conveyances to the plaintiffs; the character of the buildings
showing them not to be essentially dependent on the rear windows for light; the
nature and effect of previous alienations of adjacent property by the common vendor ; the express provision of a four-feet right of way in the rear of the plaintiffs'
tenements, were held to be circumstances sufficient to negative any implied easement of light and air over adjacent land retained by the vendor of the plaintiffs.
It is settled law that there is no implied reservation of a right to light and air.
So that if one sells vacant land and retains the house adjoining, the ,purchaser of
the vacant land may build thereon, though he darken thereby the windows of the
house of his vendor.
The owner 9f Jhe servient estate cannot by the unlawful destruction of an
easement extinguish the right of the owner of the dominant estate thereto; and the
latter owner .may, in proper cases, have relief in equity, and not be driven to an
action for damages.

Cltoss appeals from Johnson.District Court.
The plaintiffs, Morrison and Startsman, severally own two
brick stores in Iowa City fronting north on Washington street.
Startsman purchased the ground on which he erected his store
of the defendant Robinson, there being on it at the time an old'
frame building. Morrison purchased his present store also of
Robinson. These stores are described in the opinion. Robin.
son in his conveyances to the plaintiffs expressly granted to each
of them a right of way four feet in width. This way was located
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just in the rear of and adjoining the premises conveyed- to the
plaintiffs. Robinson also granted to the plaintiffs the right to use
a privy which adjoined this right of way, but was situate upon
vacant land then owned by Robinson, but afterwards, and quite
recently conveyed to the defendant, Marquardt. Robinson sold
to the plaintiff Startsman first. He afterwards conveyed to the
defendant, Marquardt, a store, fronting west on Clinton street,
the rear of which wds near to the rear of the store now owned by
Morrison.
After the first conveyance to Marquardt, Robinson conveyed
to the plaintiff Morrison) still retaining vacant ground- in the rear
of all of these stores, and south of the four feet right of way.
This vacant ground (being the same on which the privy before
referred to, was situated) he afterwards sold and conveyed to, the
defendant. Shepherd and Hess owned the ground on the east
of that which formerly belonged to Robinson.
After his purchase of this vacant ground- Marquardt, claiming
that the privy.vault was filled, and the structure itself a nuisance,
removed the same, and commenced preparations to extend his
store eastward, and clear across the open ground and over the
site of the privy, up to th6 walls of the store of Shepherd apd
Hess.
If the proposed building should be erected it would be within
four feet of the rear windows of the plaintiff's stores-being separated therefrom only by the above-mentioned four feet right of
way.
Whereupon plaintiffs, Morrison and Startaman, filed this bill in
equity.
_Fairall & Boal and -dmonds
6 Ransom, for plaintiffs,
clainied, 1st. That Robinson dedicated the ground east of the
stores fronting on Clinton street and south of the plaintiffs' stores,
viz., the vacant ground on which Marquardt now propoges to
build, as a court, area, or space to be peimanently left and kept
open for the use and convenience of said stores.
2d. That when Robinson sold plaintiffs the said property they
became by necessity or implication entitled to an easement of
light and air, and that this easement will be destroyed by the
erection of the proposed addition to his building by the defendant,
Marquardt.
VOL. XVI.-2
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3d. That they had an easement in the privy; and that Mar
quardt had no right to remove or destroy the building.
Plaintiffs prayed an injunction to defendants from building on
the open area aforesaid or any part thereof; and that plaintiffs be
entitled to have erected and maintained at the expense and costs
of said Robinson said privy so removed as aforesaid.
W. Penn Clarke and A. TV. Gaston, for defendants.
The answer denied, any dedication of the open area; admitted
the removal of the privy, and claimed that it was a nuisance and
the vault full ; also admitted that Marquardt did propose to extend
his store two or three stories in height, east, but not so as to
interfere with the four 'feet right of way south of plaintiffs' premises ; and denied that the proposed erection would -substantially
interfere with tle comfortable or reasonable enjoyment of the
plaintiffs' stores as respects air and light.
The cause was referred to a referee whose report was in favor
of allowing .the defendant to erect a building in the rear of plain.
tiffs' premises one story in height.
A decree was entered accordingly. Both parties appeal.
Plaintiffs claim that Marquardt should have been restrained
from erecting any building whatever in the rear- of their stores.
On the other hand, Marquardt claims that the injunction should
have been dissolved and that he should have been'allowed to
build without any restrictionas to height. The other questions
made appear in the opinion.
DILLON, C. J.-The main principles involved in this cause have
never been judicially settled in this state. They are principles
of no ordinary importance. The adjudications elsewhere upon
the same. or similar questions' are not uniform. This court is
charged with the duty of deciding, which is the better, or what is
the true rule in cases- of this character.
Befoie proceeding further it should be observed that the testimony is voluminous and upon some points conflicting. So far as
the ease involves questions of fact merely, it is not proposed to
enter into an extended review of the evidence.
So far as it involyes questions of law and principles applicable
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to future cases, a more extended examination is not only proper,
but is required, both by the importance of the cause itself and
the conspicuous ability with which it has been argued by the
respective counsel.
It should be further remarked that the defendant admits the
existence of the four feet right of way immediately south of the
plaintiffs' premises, and claims no right to build thereon; but
admits that he proposes to build up to the line thereof.
I. As to the alleged dedication.-Plaintiffsinsist that the property on which the defendant now proposes to build, was dedicated by Robinson as an open area for access to the various stores,
as a place whereon to deposit barrels, boxes, &c., and to supply
the rear of the stores with light and air. It is claimed also that
the defendant knew of this dedication prior to his recent purchase
of this vacant ground.
No map or plat showing, and no writing expressing such dedication was ever made.
But plaintiffs contend that there may be a dedication by parol,
and that the present is a case of that character.
That there may be a dedication to public use without a deed or
other written evidence, is undoubtedly true. But in such cases
the intent to dedicate should be clear, and the acts or circumstances relied on to establish such intention unequivocal and -convincing.
The present case does not meet this requirement. The plain
tiffs testify that as an inducement to the purchase of their
respective parcels, Robinson stated to thim that the area should
remain open to the use of all of the stores around it, the same as
before. But this is positively denied both by Robinson and Judge
Miller, his agent.
It is argued that plaintiffs are corroborated by the almost uniform depth of the various stores, and the fact that the ground had
been left open and remained open without objection until about
the time this suit was brought. But this is more than overcome
by the circumstances that Robinson always claimed to own the
open ground in question; paid taxes thereon; exercised control
thereover; and by the silence of the conveyances to the plaintiffs
respecting any such right as that now claimed.
It appears that the conveyances were made with deliberation

MORRISON v. MARQUARDT.

and examined with care before being accepted. They are minute
as to other rights and privileges-rights of way, use of privy,
&c.,-but silent as to any rights in, to, or over the vacant ground,
the alleged dedication of which is now claimed to have been a
controlling inducement to the purchasers.
If it was understood that the plaintiffs were to have such valuable rights in this vacant ground, or if it was understood that it
was dedicated to their use or that of the public, it is scarcely
credible that they would have been satisfied with deeds making
specific and anxious mention of "mint and anise and cummin,"
yet wholly " omitting theweightier matters" of the contract.
Again, Robinson had not the power to leave it all opefi as it is
claimed he represented he would. For Wheeler had his lease
for 99 years, for 90 feet in depth and up to within 20 feet of
plaintiffs' stores. Wheeler might build on or enclose this at his
pleasure. He was not restricted as to the depth of the luildings
to be erected by him.
.When Morrison purchased, Marquardt owned the land south of
the window in the cellar and lower story of the Morrison building, and this was known to Morrison, and it is not likely he would
buy relying upon Robinson's promise that all. the land should be
kept open.
The maxim expressio unius, &c., or at least the reason upun
which it rests, would seem justly to apply here. "Forwhy mention
a right of way four feet in width, if all was to remain open for a
rear drive, access, place of deposit, &c. ? Again, the weight of
testimony decidedly is that the plaintiffs, or at least one of them,
wished to 'purchase of Robinson to build thereon the ground
which they now claim was dedicated by him as an open area.
Upon the whole the court is well satisfied that the plaintiff's
claim of dedication is not established. The case is essentially
unlike Maxwell v. East BRiver Bank, 3 Bosw. 125, 26 N. Y.
Rep. 105, and other cases cited on this head by the plaintiffs'
counsel.
II. As to the alle'ied easement of light and air.-The ne~t
point made by the plaintiffs is, that it is an established pinciple
of law that if one man builds a house with windows and doors
looking over or opening upon his adjoining vacant land, and sells
the house, neither he ncr ais grantee cari afterwards build upon
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the vacant ground so as seriously to obstruct the flow of light and
air to the windows and doors of that house. Plaintiffs do not
contend for the English doctrine of a rreserirtive right to light
and air. But the exact position they take as expressed in their
written argument, is, ",That Robinson, the former owner of the
parcels sold to Morrison and Startsman .(the plaintiffs), and at
the same time of the open ground (subsequently sold defendant,
and upon which he proposes to build), having sold to plaintiffs
their respective parcels with buildings having windows, cannot
afterwards build upon that portion retained by him in such a way
as to obstruct the light and air necessary to the comfortable
enjoyment of the plaintiffs' buildings, and what Robinson himself
could not do, Marquardt, his grantee, cannot.
Defendants' counsel deny that this is an established- principle
of law.
That this principle is recognised by the English courts admits
of no doubt. Mr. Washbiurn states it thiis: "If one who has
a house with windows looking upon his own vacant ground, sell
the same, he may not erect upon-his vacant land a structure which
shall essentially deprive such house of the light through its windows
(Easements, 492, pl. 5).
Speaking of this subject Chief Justice TINDAL (in Swansborough v. Uoventry, 9 Bing. 805, 0. B. 183a) says: It is well
established by the decided cases that where the same person
possesses a house, haviag the actual use and enjoyment of certain'
lights and also possesses the adjoining land, and sells the house to
another person, although the lights be new; .hecannot, nor can any
one who claims under him build upon the adjoining land so as to
obstruct or interrupt the enjoyment of those lights. The principle is laid down by TwIsDEN and WYNDHAM, JJ., in the case of
Palmer v. Fletcher, 1 Lev. 122, "That no man shall derogate
from his own grant." The same law was adhered to inthe case
of Cox v. Mathews, 1 Ventr. 287; by HoLT, C. J., in Boswell v.
Pryor, 6 Mod. 116; 12 Id. 215, 685, and lastly in the case of
Crompton v. Bichards, 1 Price 27, A. D. 1814.
The doctrine in question essentially rests upon Palmer v.
Fletcher, Cox v. Mathews, and Boswell v. Pryor,above cited.
The other cases in England follow these as establishing tho
principle laid down by C. J. TI DAL, in the extract just given.
These cases are very briefly reported; and for convenience,
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and that -what was decided may be exactly seen, are given ib
a note.'

The decisions in this country on the exact point as to whether
IPalmer v. Fletcher (I Lev. 122, s. c. I Siderf. 167, K. B. 15 Charles I1.L
was an action on the-case for stopping lights. Absente le Chiefle
Justir.e. A
erected a house upon part of his land, and demised the house to B., and the residu6
of the land to C., and C., with " loggs and auters choses sur le terre adjoynant," so
obstructed the windows of the house as to render thlem dark and useless. It was
held that neither A., who built the house, nor C., claiming under him, could stop
up the existing windows in the house.
The reason given is, that the grantor of the house could not derogate from his
own grant. KLLYNoB, J., and TwisDEN, J., differed as to the effect had the
vacant land been sold first and the house afterwards. The first contending that in
that case the purchaser of the vacant ground might have stopped the lights ; the
latter denying that this would make any difference. [KELYNGE, J., was right, as
mhown by subsequent cases: Tenant v. Goodwin, 2 Lord Raymd. 1093; White v.
Bass, 7 Hurlst. & Norm. 722.]
Cox v. Mathews, f Ventr. 239, was decided in 25 Charles II. It was an action
for stopping lights. Lord HALL delivered the judgment of the court, as follows
"If a man builds a house upon his own ground, he that hath the contiguous
grbund may build upon it, although he doth thereby stop the lights of the other
house, for cujus est solum ejus est usque ad cerum, unless there be a custom to the contrary, as in London." "But if a man should build a house upon his own ground,
find then grant the house to A., and grants certain lands adjoining to B., B. could
not build to the stoppin'g up of A.'s lights in that ease." This'is all of the judgment, except the remark of his Lordship, " that the present was a plain case, for
the defendant fixed boards to the plaintiff's house."
Note: That the case before the court was one whefe the obstruction to the light
was upon land immediatdy adjoining, and the defendant had undertaken to nail up
plaintiff's windows.
Roswell v.Pryor, in different phases, was three times before the court : 6 Mod.
116 ; s. c. 12 Mod. 215, 635. It was decided by K. B. in 2 Anne.
The action was for stopping lights. The question before the court (6 Mod. 116)
was one of .pleading, viz., whether the declaration was good without saying that
the plaintiff's house was an ancient nessuage. The declaration did not show,
though such seems to have been the case, that plaintiff and defendant were lessees
under a common lessor.
Lord HOLT'S opinion is in the following words: "If a man have a vacant piece
of ground, and builds thereupon, and that house has very good lights, and he lets
this house to another, and afterwards builds upon a contiguous piece of ground, or
lets the contiguous piece of ground to another, who builds theieupon to the ntisance
of the lights in the first house., the lessee of the first house shall have an action
upon the case against such builder, for the first house was granted to him with all
the easements and delights then belonging to it."
Note : That the facts of the case are not reported so. that its exact nature is
known; also, that the case put relates alone to landlord's right to erect upon contiguous ground buildings which shall operate to the nuisance of the lights in the
lessee's house:
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the right to light and air will pass by implied grant are neither
very numerous or uniform.
As sustaining the doctrine, that a vendor of a house cannot
afterwards, on his adjoining *vacant land, make an erection which
shall deprive such house of light, see Story v. Odin, 12 Mass.
157; United States v. Appleton, 1 Sumn. 492 (arguendo per
STORY, j.);
Lamphin v. Mills, 21 N. Y. 505 (arguendo per
SELDEN, J.);
Gerber v. Grabel, 16 Ill. 217 (arguendo).
Opposed to this.doctrine, see Myers v. Gemmel, 10 Barb. 537;
Palmer v. Wetmore, 2 Sandf. S. Ct. Rep. 316 ; Parkerv. Foote,
19 Wend. 309 (arguendo per BRONSON, J.); Haverstick v. Sipe,
33. Pa. St. 368 (arguendo per LoWRIE, 0. J.).
The grant of easements has been much discussed in the courts
of England of late years, as will be seen by the following cases"
Pyer v. Carter, 1 Hurlst. & Norm. (1 Exch.) 916, 1857 (as to
drain); explained Polden v. Bastard, 116 Eng. 0, L. 257 (use
of pump); Glave v. Harding, 3 H. & N. -937 ; White v. Bass,
7 Hurlst. & Norm. 722, 1862 (as to light); Curriers Co. v
Corbett, 2 Dr'. & Sm. 355; Suffield v. Brown, 10 Jun. N. S.
"111 ; Crossley v. Lightowler, 3 Law Rep. Eq. 279, 1866 ; Clark
v. Clarke, 1 Id. 16; Id. 442; Martin v. Headon, 2 Id. 425;
Dent v. Auction Manuf. Go., Id. 238; Dodd v. Burchell, 1
Hurlst. & Coltm. 113, 119; commenting *on Pyer v. Carter,
8upra. And. see, also, Judge REDFILD'S observations in Am.
Law'Reg., January 1865, pp. 134, 135.
After this glance at the state of the adjudications the question
recurs, Is it a principle in our law, that if a man sells a house
with windows and. doors opening on to his Vacant ground, he nor
his grantee cannot afterwards build upon Such vacant ground in
such a manner as seriously to obstruct the flow of light and airto such house, without express reservationof the right to do so ?
Did this question depend alone upon the authority of the English cases, it would have to be answered in the affirmative. . It is,
however, justly observed by Mr. Washburn, that the decisions
as to implied easements of ligtt and air are not uniform, nor in
all cases satisfactory (Easements 497, pl. 17). If it be held,
that there iiay be implied easements as to light and air-as this
implication arises wholly from the condition and circumstances
of the estates to which the easement relates, and as this condition
and these circumstances %realmost infinitely varied, it is easy to
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perceive the difficulties which environ the practical application
of the doctrine.
Perhaps the law as to implied easements generally cannot be
said to be fully settled, and this is particularly true in this
country as to easements of lighbt and air.
The right to light and air seems to me to be, in many respects,
different in its nature from easements relating to artificial erections on the servient estate, such as drains, gutters, pipes, &c.,
or rights of way and the like (see Parker v. Poote, 19 Wend.
809, per BRoxsoN, J. ; Dodd v. Burchell, 1 Hurlst. & Coltm.
113., 119, per POLLOCK, C. B. ; Haverstick v. Sipe, 33 Pa. St.
R. 368, 371, per LowRIE, 0. J.).
As to light and air I am free to say, that I do not believe the
rule as applied to our situation and circumstances a sound one,
which holds that under any circumstances this right can by implication be burdened upon an adjoining estate, so as to prevent the
owner thereof from building upon or improving it as he pleases.
I would rev.erse the rule contended for by the plaintiff, and hold
that he who claims that the ten, twenty, or thirty feet. adjoining
him (which in cities may be very valuable) shall remain vacant'
and unimpr6ved, should found such claim upon an express grant
or covenant.
This rule is simple. Grantor and grantee would both know
that the deed is the measure of their rights. Is it any hardship
upon the purchaser to secure by express grant rights so valuable
to him and so detrimental to his grantor ? Rights which unless
limited, and defined by written stipulations, are of uncertain
extent and of indefinite duration (see remarks of PATTESON, J.,
in Blanchardv. Bridges, 4 Ad. & Ellis 176).
Such a-rule also harmonizes with, while the opposite rule contravenes, the purpose of our Registration Laws.
A denial of an easement by- mere implication, as respects light
and air, may in my judgment well be, without denying that other
easpements, of a different character, may and in some cases should
he held to exist by implication.
But in the case at bar the court do not regard it as necessary
more positively to deny the general doctrine contended for by
plaintiff's counsel.
The doctrine of implied easements rests upon the supposed
intention of the parties, as deduced from fhe situation and condi
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tion of the two estates to which the easement relates. An-uasement may be briefly defined to be a charge or burden upon one
estate (the servient) for the benefit of another (the dominant).
In this case it would be a burden upon the estate retained by
Robinson and afterwards sold to the defendant, for the advantage
of the plaintiff's estate. This burden or servitude is, -hat this
should remain vacant, if to improve it would materially obstruct
the passage of light and air to the plaintiff's stores.
Now the circumstances surrounding this transaction make it
quite clear that it was never intended that this easement should.
exist.

In discussing a- similar question, Mr. Justice STORY well remarks: "That in the construction of grants, the court ought to
take into consideratioh the circumstances attendant upon the
transaction, the particular situation of the parties, the state of
the country, and the state of the thing granted, for the purpose of
ascertaining the intention of the* parties :" United Statee v.
Appleton, I Sumn. Rep. 492, 520; see also 2 Washb. Real
Prop. 26; Broom's .Legal Max. 261 ; Washb. on Easements 36,
pl. 12; Karnullerv. Krotz,.18 Iowa 852; Haveratice v. Sipe,
33 Pa. St. Rep. 368, 371.
The first circumstance we refer to as evincing this intention, is
the language and characterof the conveyances to the plaintiffs.
These conveyahces contain express language as to several ease.
ments.
The right of way is an easement. And in. the deeds to both
plaintiffs that is expressly secured. The right to the use of the
privy is an easement. And in both deeds it is stipulated for in
terms. The right of Startsman to right of ivay on the east (two.
and-a-half feet in width) was an easement, as was also his right
to extend the second story of his building over it., Both of these
were provided for in express words in his deed. And the same
is true as respects the right of Morrison to the roof under the
Downey contract with Robinson. This is also set down in.,his
deed. Now these are all easements, and. are carefully secured by
the deeds. If the parties had contemplated any other easement,
such as the important one to light and air, would it not also most
likely have been secured by the.deed ?
The intention ot the parties will be more manifest by other
considerations.
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We allude next to the character and situation of the buildings
purchased by the plaintiffs of _obinson.
They both fronted on Washington street, which is 100 feet
wide.
Morrison's store was built by Robinson, that is, the first and
second stories were built by him, and the third story by Cook,
S. & Downey in conjunction with him.
It was only fifty feet deep, and seventeen feet wide insideThe stories are about fourteen feet high. The front in the first
story is an open one, composed of glass and iron-the windows
being show windows ten feet high, with two sets of lights each.
In the rear of the first story was one door and one window,
beyond which extended the eleven feet embraced in defendant's
original purchase, which was prior to Morfison's purchase. The
rear cellar-window was very small, about eighteen inches or two
feet square, with but two or three inches above the ground.
There Was a front cellar-window, and the outside entrance to tho
cellar was in front.
The second story had two large windows in front and one in
the rear. When Morrison bought, the only access to, the second
story was by a stairway in the rear of the -first story. The first
and second stories had one room each; and were "finished off for
one storeroom-counter and shelves below, and shelves above."
Such was the condition when Morrison purchased.
Since then Morrison has entirely changed the interior arrangement. The stairway to second story has been removed; an
entrance has been obtained to, the second story froth the west.
The second -story has been partitioned off into two rooms, and is
used for offices-the rear window being relied on for light to the'
back office.
When Startsman purchased, there was upon it a one story
frame house with an open front, and with an addition extending
back.to near the south line. In the rear there was but one small
window of but six or eight panes of glass. This old building
was removed and the- present structure erected by Startsman,
with an open front like Morrison's in the first story, and three
windows in the front of the second story. In the rear of the
first story there is a sash door and a large window.
It is proper to observe, that Robinson knew when he sold that
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Startsman intended to replace the frame building with a new
structure.
These circumstances have been mentioned for the purpose of
showing that these buildings for the purposes for which they were
erected, and in the condition in which they were sold, were not
essentially dependent upon the rear windows for light: See
Washb. on Easements 504, pl. 26, 502, pl. 20; Blanchard v.
Bridges, 4 Ad. & Ellis 174; .ifty Associates v. Tudor, 6 Gray
255, approving Back v. Stacy, 2 Car. & P. 465; Parker v.
-Smith, 5 Id. 438; 7 Id. 377, 410; and recent English equity
-ases before cited, as to wvhat amount of light a party is entitled
to under an implied grant or prescriptive right.
If not thus dependent upon the rear openings for "such an
amount of light and air as is reasonably necessary to the comfortable and useful, occupation" of the building, the necessity for an
implied grant does not exist, and the presumption that there was
such a grant is very much iveakened, if not'entirely overthrown.
Surely such.an easement, uncertain in its extent and duration,
without any written or record evidence of its existence, fettering
estates, and laying an embargo upon the hand of improvement
which carries the trowel and the plane, and, as applied to a subsequent purchaser, against the spirit of our recording acts and not
demanded by any consideration of public policy-surely such an
easement should not be held to exist by mere implication when
such'implication originates in no reasonable necessity.
Mr. Washburn, assuming -or taking for granted, that there
may be an implied grant of such easements, observes that "1the
test seems to be whether what is claimed is reasonably necessary
to the enjoyment of the part granted, and where that is not the
case, it requires descriptive words of grant in the deed, to create
an easement in favor of one part of a heritage over another:"
Easements 61, pl. 42; 36, pl. 12; 504, pl. 26.
Again he says the implied easements (according to the tendency
of the cases) will be held not to exist except in instances where
if the grantor were to build on his vacant land, the owner of the
house would be "virtually deprived" of the enjoyment thereof:
Id. p. 502, pl. 20.
But there are other strong circumstances in the situation of the
property against the existence of the supposed easement. Defend.

MORRISON v. MARQUARDT.

ant who now proposes to build, purchased his store before Morrison did, and at the same time purchased eleven feet in the rear.
This eleven feet extended east beyond the rear window of
Morrison. Robinson retained no rights in this eleven feet.
Could not defendant at' once -have built upon this eleven feet,
although it should.obstruct the light to the store then owned by
Rol inson, but afterwards sold to the plaintiff, Morrison?
Plaintiff's counsel have seen the importance of this point, and
argue that the defendant could not build bn the eleven feet so as
to darken the windows of the Morrison store, even though Robinson were' yet the owner thereof. In their written argument they
say: "The doctrine of implied reservation keeps almost equal
pace with and is as fully recognised as that of implied grant.
The rule is, that if a man have a house with lights, and sell the
same, but retains the land adjoining, he may not build thereon to
the damage df the lights in the house sold ; so ifhe sells, the land
and retains the house, the purchaser may not build thereon to
the damage'of the lights of the house."
*Such it seems to us cannot be the law. Such a doctrine as
applicable to cities would be intolerable. The vendor sells the
land, makes no reservation of any rights therein, parts with his
dominion over it, receives his pay for it, and when his vendee
proposes to build, he stays his hand with an implied reservation,
and the vendee finds that he has made a barren, unprofitable pur.
chase-that he owns and pays taxes upon a lot to afford the vendor
an unobstructed supply of air and sunlight.
Lord. HOLT denies such to be the law in Tenant v; Goodwin,
2 Ld. Raym. 1093, and his opinion was recently (A. D. 1862)
approved by the Court of Exchequer in White v. Bass, 7 H. &
N. 722 (denying doctrine of implied reservation of an easement
for light). See also Curriers Co. v. Corbett, 2 Dr. & Sm. 355 ;
Suffield v. Brown, 10 Jur. N. S. 111 ; Crossley v. Lightowler,
3 Law Rep. Eq. 279, 1866; Washb. Easements 32, pl. 11; Id.
494, pl. 10; Johnson v. Jordan, 2 Met..(Mass.) 234; Havet
stick v. Sipe, 33 Pa. St. R. 368 (1859).
Therefore the defendant had the right to build and darken the
rear window of what is now the Morrison store, and- Robinson
could not resist it. His right thus to build was not affected by
the subsequent sale of the store by Robinson to Morrison. This
being so there was no implied grant in the sale to Morris(n from
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Robinson that the windows should remain unobstructed by buildings in the rear.
The store of Startsman was not then erected. Although Robinson knew he intended to build, there is no evidence that he knew
such building when erected would essentially or reasonably need
light and air from the rear, and hence it seems difficult to say
that there was an implied grant of such an easement. This consideration, alone, it seems to us, is conclusive against the claim
of Startsman.
. Another and quite important circumstance against the implied
easement of light and air over the entire vacant ground owned by
Robinson at the time of the sales to the plaintiffs is the express
grant of a fourfeet right of way. This has before been alluded
to in respect to other questions in the case.
In all the cases we have examined in which an implied grant
of light and air has been recognised the house sold and the land
to which the easement has- been attached were adjoining. See
Patmer v. Fletcher; Cox v. Mathews; Roswell v. Pryor; and
other cases before referred to and stated.
We have found no case, although we have directed particular
attention to the point, in which an implied grant of light and air
has been holden to exist where the vendor at the time of the sale
of the first parcel laid out a space or passage between it and the
portion of the .heritage or estate retained by him.
The servient tenement is thus disconnected from the dominant.
It is argued" by plaintiffs' counsel that this is simply a way,and has no reference to light and air. Sar is a street or an alley
a way-but-.it is also an open space which admits the flow of light
and air. The object of this way in the present case was to secure
a passage to the privy, also an outlet through the right of way on
the east, and probably a right of way to the contemplated ten
foot alley; and also to secure the plaintiffs' estates against theerection -of buildings nearer than the four feet.
If the aliunde testimony is competent to show the purposes for
which the private way was laid out by Robinson, it shows that
these were the purposes.
Without positively deciding that there may not, under any circumstances, be an implied easement of light and air, we hold that
the circumstances before enumerated negative any such implica
tion or easement in the case under consideration.
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III. As to the removal and destruction of the privy.-The
next and only remaining -question relates to the plaintiffs' rights
in respect to the privy.
This was situate on land owned by Robinson at the time he sold
to the plaintiffs, and it adjoined the private way in the rear of
their stores. The. plaintiffs' deeds in express terms granted to
then1"the right to the use of the privy."
This right was embraced in the consideration paid for the pro.
perty. It was not revocable at the will of Robinson or his
grantee. It would exist as long at least as the privy should stand
and have a right to stand..
Defendant purchased the land upon which it was situate and
removed it at night without the consent of the plaintiffs.
He justifies this act upon two grounds:1st. He claims that the vault was full and hence the easement
was at an end.
2d. If this is not so, he claims the structure had become a nuisance, and -therefore he had a right to abate it, and he abated it
by removing it.
The first ground is not supported by the evidence. The vault
was not entirely filled, and if it were, we think Plaintiffs might.
ifthey saw proper, remove the contents and thus continue the
right to the use of the structure. The point is made that it was
Robinson's duty to keep it in order, and that the defendant by his
purchase takes Robinson's place.
But the deed is silent upon this point, and it is not essential to
determine upon whom the duty of keeping it in order would rest.
(See Washh. Easements, ch. 6, §:1, p. 564.) Nor do we think
the defendant was. justified in removing it with strong hand and
against the plaintiffs' wishes on the ground that it was a nuisance.
A party may with his own hand 'abate that which is to him a
nuisance. But such abatement'does not consist in the destruction
of the property unless such destruction be absolutely necessary.
It-is the offensive use.of it that he is justified in abating: Bar.
clay v. Commonwealth, 25 Pa. St. R. 503; 2 Hilliard Torts 95:
Plaintiffs asked to try disinfectants; Defendant refused, .claimed
the right to remove it, and did remove it the same night.
The right to the use of this out-house.was property, and the
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plaintiffs' rights could not be thus summarily determined by the
defendant.
Defendant claims that the plaintiffs' right to use the privy ended
when Robinson conveyed to him; that the grant of the use is not
a covenant running with the land.
The plaintiffs' rights were in the nature of a burden upon the
estate on which the privy stood. The conveyance to the defendant of the estate did. not disburden it of this servitude ; particularly is this so, as the deed to the defendant is expressly made
subject to the plaintiffs' rights.
Again, the defendant claims "that whether it was removed
legally or illegally, the destruction of the privy extinguished the
easement."
If plaintiffs, as the owners of the dominant- heritage, had
destroyed it, this might well be held to extinguish the easement.
But not when such destruction is by the party owning7 the estate
which owes the servitude. -The law holds out no such bonus for
the commission of torts. Nor does it allow a party to gain and
base a. right upon an illegal act.
Again, it is contended that being destroyed, the only remedyof the plaintiffs is an action for damages, as the court has no
power to restore the privy.
But it has the power to order the defendant to restore it, or to
allow this to .be done by the plaintiffs at his expense.
As respects the privy we think the plaintiffs have a right nnder
the circumstances aboie -stated, to be put in 8tatw quo..
The cause will be remanded with directions to the court below
to dismiss the plaintiffs' bill except as to the rights in relation to
the privy; to enter a decree that defendant shall restore this, or,
in default thereof, that plaintiffs may do so, and the expense or so
much thereof as may be equitable to be charged to the defendant.
The decree will also enjoin the defendant from erecting his
proposed building so as to interfere with the site of the privy.
Plaintiffs may, if they elect, claim damages and waive the right
to a restoration of the privy. All rights in relation to the supposed ten feet alley on the east of the premises to remain open,
not being embraced in this adjudication.
Reversed.

IRVING BANK v. WETHERALD.

Court of Appeals of New York.
THE IRVING BANK v. JAMES WETHERALD AND OTHERS.
A promissory note being presented by one bank at another bank where it was
made payable, was certified to be good had was then stamped " paid" by the presenting bank, but on the same day the maker's want of funds being discovered,
notice was given to the preseiiting bank, which however declined to cancel the
certificate. The certifying bank then paid the amount, took the note and re-presented it at its own counter, had it duly protested and notified the indorsers. Held,
that the facts did not amount to payment of the note and the bank was entitled to
recover from the indorsers.
Per HuNT, J.-The certifying bank having given notice of its mistake to the
presenting bank before the latter had done or omitted any act by which its rights
were impaired, the certifying bank was released from .liability on its erroneous
ertificate, and need not have paid the amount of the note.

THE questions in this case arise upon the following facts, which
are found by the judge who tried the cause, without a jury :On the 7th day of December 1858, one Morris Wilson made
his note for. $804.80, at eight months, payable at the Irving
Bank, to his own order; he indorsed the same, and it was also
indorsed by Wetherald "& Young, the defendants. Said note,
before maturity, was duly discounted by the Seventh Ward Bank
fir the defendants. On the day the .aforesaid note matured the
Seventh Ward Bank, as the owner thereof, presented it to the
paying teller of the Irving Bank, who ce.rtified it in the usual
manner as good, and charged the same to Morris Wilson, in *the
books of the Irving Bank. At this time Morris Wilson had no
funds in the bank. Immediately upon said note being returned
to the Seventh Ward Bank, certified, that bank caused the same
to be stamped "1p aid." Upon the discovery by the officers of
the IrvingBank of the mistake of their paying teller, in certify.
ing said note, and before 3 o'clobk of the same day, the said
Irving Bank notified the said Seventh Ward Bank'of the mistake,
and requested the said certificate to be cancelled, which the'said
Seventh Ward Bank refused. Upon the refusal of said Seventh
Ward Bank to cancel said certificate, the s&id Irving Bank paid
to said -,Seventh Ward Bank the full amount of said note,
and received the same into their possession, stamped "Paid,"
as aforesaid; and thereupon, on the same day of its miturity,
and before 8 o'clock, P. m., the same was again presented at the
counter of the Irving Bank, for payment, payment demanded,
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and the. same duly protested for non-payment, and notice thereof
given to the defendants.
The court directed judgment in favor of the defendants. The
General Term of the First District reversed this judgment, and
ordered a new trial. The defendants appeal to this court, stipulating that if the order granting a new trial be affirmed, judgment absolute may be entered against them.
Tyler, for appellant.

B. -Fitc, for respondent.
HUNT, J.-Both the judge at the Circuit and the Gcneral
Term, are of the opinion that the notice by the plaintiffs to the
Seventh Ward Bank, of the mistake in certifying Wilson's check
to be good, before any steps- had been taken, or any measures
omitted? by the Seventh Ward Bank, and while there was still
time to fix all the parties upon the note, relieved the plaintiffs
from their liability on the certificate. In this opinion I concur.
Such a certificate possessed no extraordinary or hidden power.
It should impdse no greater liability than its terms fairly require.
Divested of all technical t&rms, the transaction in question was
simply.this: The Seventh Ward Bank present for payment, at
the Irving Bank, where it was made payable, the note of Morris
Wilson. The.making the note payable there, was a warrant from
the xaaker to the latter bank, to pay it from his funds, and.charge it to him. When the note is presented, the teller of the paying
bank informs the p~esenter that the note is. good ; in other words,
that the makerhas the funds in the bank to'meet it. This information may be communicated verbally, by ltter, or by a memorandum on the note, ordinarily called ,a certificate. If the note
were presented by an individual, the money would ordinarily be
paid to him, in satisfaction, and the note left With the paying
bank. In the case of a bank, the note is taken back by the
party owning it, to be returned the next day in the settlement of
exchanges, as an item of credit in its favor and against the certifying bank. This is the usual course of business in the city of
New York. The correctness of this certificate is a matter which
the certifying bank has the means of knowing, and it is bound to
state correctly. If the presenting bank relies upon its accuracy,
and fails to charge the indorsers, as upon non-payment on preVOL. XVI.-23'
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sentation, the certifying bank is estopped from denying the trutlh
of its statement. Having asserted of its own knowledge that
the maker had funds in its bank to meet the note, and the presenting tank having omitted to charge its indorsers in reliance
upon such statement, the certifying bank will not be permitted to
go behind its own statements.
The teller of the bank is the
proper officer to make this statement, and his statement binds the
bank, whether accurate or erroneous.
These principles were
established in Meads v. The Merchants. Bank of Albany, 25
N. Y. 143, and in Farmers' and Mechanics'. Bank of Kent
County v. But chers' and -Drovers' Bank, 16 N. Y. 125. In
the prese nt case, the Irving Bank discovered .its.error in stating
that it had funds for the payment of Wilson's note, in sufficient
time to prevent any loss in consequence of the error. It immediately notified the Seventh Ward Bank of the error, and in time
to enable it to make a re-presentment, if necessary, and to charge
the indorsers. -No damage, therefore, could accrue to the latter
bank from the erroneous information. They were bound to accept
and to act upon the corrected information, if there were time and
opportunity to do so. -I agree with the court below that the
plaintiffs might have stopped at that point, and there would have
been no liability on their part, to the Seventh Ward Bank. That
bank went farther, however, .and upon .the refusal of the Seventh
Ward Bank to cancel their certificate, paid to that bank the
amount of the iiote, re-presented it at their own counter, -and
gave notice of non-payment to the defendants as indorsers
thereof. This the judge at Specl al Term held to amount in law
to a payment of the note. The General Term held otherwise,
and reversed his judgment.
It was agreed by the. judge at
Special Term, tbt' the certificate of the paying teller was not'
payment of the note.
In this he was no doubt correct.
It
has also been held, and correctly, that the staiping a note as
"paid,"
or marking it with. a cancelling hammer, does not
constitute a payment: Scott v. Betts, Lalor's Sup. to H. & D.
363, and note ; Watervliet Bank v. White, 1 D.enio 608.
That.the advance of the amount of the note byr the plaintiffs tp
the Seventh Ward Bank was made. to relieve them from an "appre.
hended liability on their certificate, and was not intended by thei
to be in discharge of the note, is obvious from the immediate
re-presentment of the note for payment, and notice to the indorsers
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that the same had not been paid. There could have been no 6ther
purpose in this than to charge the parties to an existing note.
So, if they had intended a 4payment and discharge of the note,
they would have allowed its return in the exchanges of the day
following, in the usual course of business, instead of making a
special payment of the same. The judge has not found as a fact
that the note was intended to be paid by the Irving Bank, or that
it was paid by them. He could -not have so found upon the
testimony with propriety. He simply finds that the plaintiffs
paid "the amount of the note" to the Seventh Ward Bank, and
he holds as a legal result that the advance of the money, under
th e circumstances stated, operated to discharge and cancel the
note. In this conclusion I think he erred. The plaintiffs took
the-note as a purchaser, and acquired the rights of a holder. See
Watervliet Bank v. WVite, 1 Denio 608. In that case the
Watervliet Bank, at whose counter the note was made payable,
received it from the holder for collection, and having an account
with the maker which, however, was not good for the amount,
charged it to him and paid it to the holder, at the same time
placing upon it a cancelling mark. By the practice of the bank
this mark only denoted that *the note was charged. In a suit on
the note by the bank, as indorser against the maker, it was held
that the bank held it with the rights of a "purchaser, and could
maintain the. action.
In the present case the plaintiffs feared a liability, to the
Seventh Ward Bank, by reason of their mistaken certificate of
the goodness of the note. They advanced to that bank its amount
for the 'purpose of representing it for piyment, notflying the
indorsers, and holding it as an existing security. The defendants
are 'indorsers duly charged. They received themselves the amount
of the note upon its discount. It has never been paid, and is now
an available security in the hands of the plaintiffs.
The order of the general term should be affirmed, and judg.
ment absolute ordered in favor of the plaintiffs for the amount of
the note and interest.

RICHARDS v. PHCENIX IRON CO.

Supreme Court of .Pennsyvania.
RICHARDS v. PHCENIX IRON CO.
Where a particular kind of fuel, the use of which is productive of injury to the
owners of neighboring property, is necessary in the course of a manufacture 4n
which the parties using it are largely engaged, and whose products the public
require; and the process of manufacture and fuel used are generally employed in
similar establishments, and there is neither a wilful or negligent infliction of injury,
equity will not enjoin against the use of such fuel; but will leave the party complaining to his action at law for damages.
" Seeable, that if the use of such fuel in the particular manufacture were unnecessary, and other fuel was equally good and Available, or that by a reasonable
expenditure of money in the manufacturing works all injury might be avoided,
equity would enjoin against it as a nuisance, where injury was inflicted upon
neighboring property.

APPEAL from the Common Pleas of Chester county.
This. was a bill in equity filed by the owner of a dwelling-house
and cotton factory in Phcenixville, to restrain the defendants
engaged in the manufacture of iron from using bituminous or
semi-bituminous coal in their furnaces, which it was alleged rendered plaintiff's dwelling-house uncomfortable and unwholesome,
and injured his factory by discoloring his fabrics and deteriorating his machinery.
The court below refused the injunction prayed, for; whereupon
the plaintiff appealed.
The facts of the case sufficiently appear in the opinion of the
court.
* . M. Meredith, Darlington
Meredith, for appelant.Plaintiff has a right to pure air; as much as a proprietor on -a
stream has a right to receive the water of the stream uncorrupted
by the proprietors above him: Howell v. Mc Coy, 3 Rawle 269;
Aldred's Case, 9"Rep. 58; Horley v. Pragnell,Cro. Car. 510;
Rex v. White 4 Ward, 1 Burr. 883 ; Rex v. Neill, 12 E. C. L.
R. 226 ; Rhodes v. Dunbar, per READ, J., at Nisi Prius, Pitts.
Leg. J6ur. N. S. 590; 8 -]31. Com. 217; 2 Show. 327.
See also the following cases of nuisance :- Walter v. .elfe, 4
De G. & S. 315; Pollocek v. -Lester, 11 Hare 266; Soltaa v.
De Held, 2 Simmons N. S. 133 ; Hole v. Barlow, 4 C. B. N. S.
334, has been overruled and severely dealt with; Bamford v.
.
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Turnley, 9 Jurist N. S. 377. See also St. Helen's Smelting Co.
v. Tipping, 5 Am. Law Reg. N: S. 104.
If this is a public nuisance, no lapse of time can save it: Commonwealth v. Alburger, 1 Whart. 469. If it is a private nuisance, defendants must prove prescription by a continued, uninterrupted, and adverse enjoyment of the easement for twenty-one
years: Howell v. .eCoy, 3 Rawle 269; Hoy v. Sterrett, 2
Watts 330; Dyer v. Depuy, 5 Whart. 595; Bliss v. Hall, 4
Bing. N. C. 183. Until then every continuance is a fresh
nuisance: Roswell v. Prior,12 Mod. "638; 3 Bi. Com. 220.
.Appellant's counsel also cited Luttrell's Case, 4 Rep. 87;
Flight v. Thomas, 10 A. & E. 590; Commonwealth v. Van
Sickle, Brightly's Rep. 69; Respublica v. Caldwell, 1 Dallas
150; Pottstown Gas Co. v. Murphy, 3 Wright 257; AttorneyGeneral ez rel. v. Council of Birmingham, 4 K. & 5. 528;
Spokes v. Banbury Board of Health, I Law Rep. Eq. Cas. 42;
Uoldsmid v. Tunbridge Wells Commissioners, Id. 161.
Defendants cannot be justified on the ground of custom: Henry
v. .Risk, 1 Dallas 265; Stoever v. Whitmani 6 Binn. 417 ; Bolton
v. Colder, 1 Watts 360; Rapp v. Palmer, 3 Id. 179; Cox v.
Heisley, 7 Harris 243; Commonwealth v. Passmore, 1 S. & f..
217 - Vaughan v. Holdes, Cro. Jac. 80. Such custom, if proved,
would be unreasonable ; there is no such thing as a legal custom
to commit a tort.
As to its being inconvenient to defendants to abate the nuisance
complained of: Commonw'alth v. -Brieand North -East Railroad
Co., 3 Casey 376.
As to the right of the plaintiff to relief when special damage to
him is shown, whether the nuisance complained of- be considere(.
a public or private nuisance: Hughes v. Heiser, 1 Binn. 463;
Pittsburgh v. Scott, 1 Barr 319; Bhodes v. Dunbar, supra;
Sparhawk Y. Railway Co., 4 P. F. Smith 401.
In regard to issuing 4,n injunction without a trial at law, see
Dennis v. .Eckhardt, 3 Grant's Cases 390; Sheetz's Appeal,
11 Casey 88; Bhodes v. Dunbar; Sparhawk v. Railway Ca., 4
P. F. Smith 401.
R. C. Me urtrie, for appellees.-There is at most an annoy.
ance, and that occasional. It is not deleterious to health. The
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prohibition to emit smoke will cause a stoppage of plaintiff's
works.
The remedy sought is not of right: Duke of Bedford v. Trus.
tees of British M-useum, 2 Mylne & K. 552; Saunders v. Smith,
3 Mylne & Craig. 711, 728; Ripon v. Herbert, 3 Mylne & K.
119'; Attorney-General v. Nichol, 16 Vesey 342; Hilton v.
Greenville, Cr. & Phil. 292; Robeson v. 'Pittinger,1 Green Oh.
R. 64; Winfield v. Crenshaw, 4 Hen. & Munf. 474; Rorer v.
.Randolph, 7 Porter 247 ; Dana v. Valentine, 5 Mete. 8 ; Eason
v. Perkins, 2 Dev. Eq. 40; Barnes v. Calhoun, 2 Iredell Ch.
201; Bradshaw v. Lea, 3 Id..305; Roberts v. Anderson, 3
Johns. Oh. Rep. 202; Smith v. Adams, 6 Paige Ch. Rep. 435;
Hamilton v. Railroad, 9 Id. 171; *Tan Bergen v. Van Bergen,.
3 Johns. Oh. Rep. 287.
It is discretionary, and the court will take all the circumstances
into consideration, and weigh the evils to both sides, and to the
public at large: Fishmongers v. E. I. Co., 1 Dickens 163;
v. Greenville; Bipon v. -Hobart; Attorney- General v.
.Nicholl; Rover v. Bandolph; Dana v. Valentine; Eason v.
Perkins; Barnes v. Calhoun; Bradshaw v. Lea, cited above;
Crowder v. Tinkler, 19 Yesey 622..
Unless plaintiff can establish by a verdict that defendant's trade
amounts to such an annoyance as to be a nuisance, equity will not
restrain a useful trade notoriously carried on without objection
even in closely built cities: Attorney-General v. Cleaver, 18
Vesey 211, 217, 220, Fishmongers v. . . Co.; Crowder v.
Tinkler, cited above; Squird v. Campbell, 1 Mylne & Cr. 459.

-Hilton

The opinion of the court was delivered at Philadelphia,.Febra.
ary 3d 1868, by
THOMPSON, C. J.-The complainant in this case is the owner
of a dwelling-house and cotton-factory in the village of Phoenixville, Chester county ; and the respondenta are the owners of very
extensive iron-works inthe same village.
The former complains that by reason of the kind of fuel usea
by the latter in these works his residence is rendered uncomforta.
ble and unwholesome ; and his factory materially injured. in the
discoloration of his fabrics and deterioration of his machinery.
Claiming that he had established this, he asked the 'court below
for a perpetual injunction to restrain the respondents from using
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the fuel -bituminous and semi-bituminous coal-complained of as
the cause of the injury to his property, in their furnaces. The
case was heard on bill and answer, and the court decided against
Ie was then permitted to file a replication and take testi.
him.
mony, on which there is a report of a master, also against him.
The court having sustained the report, again refused to enjoin
the defendants, and the case is before us on an appeal, and we are
asked to do what the court below refused, namely, to perpetually
restrain the defendants from using bituminous or semi-bituminous
coal in their' furnaces.
The defendant's works are very extensive; amongst the most
so, it is said, of any of the kind in the Commonwealth, consistin.g
of several blast furnaces, some seventy puddling furnaces and
rolling-mills, and other machinery." They began on a small scale
some forty-nine or fifty years ago, and up to 1840 used bituminous
coal exclusively. -The original works were- not precisely on the
spot of those complained of, but so near it as to entitle the latter
to be regarded as an extension of the former. The extensions
these works in 183T-46 and 1853, constitute the present
made inworks, the cost of which alone is represented as exceeding half a
million of dollars, and which, at the time of taking the testimony,
and previously, employed, as the master reports, from eight hundred to a thousand hands.
The plaintiff's dwelling, it appears, is situate on a bluff or hill.
northwardly from the defendant's works, about seventy feet above
the nearest furnace-floor, which brings its lower story about on a
level with the tops of the puddling-stacks, -and when the wind is
towards the plaintiff's' house, and from the furnaces, the conse.
quence is, that it is at times enveloped- in coal-smoke, thrown out
of the chimneys of the puddling furnaces.
It cannot be doubted, I think, that this materially operates to
injure the dwelling-house as a dwelling, and consequently deteriorates its value.
The alleged injury to the factory is, mainly, that the smoke
and soot of these furnaces blacken the stock, and render their
fabrics less saleable. This I can readily understand and believe.
The house was erected in 1829 and the factory in 1830, and
both have been generally occupied ever since-the factory not
doing full work for some time past, as the master reports.
A careful consideration of the testimony satisfies us that the
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use of semi-bituminous coal-the fuel complained of-is necessary
to the successful manufacture of iron fit for axles, cannon, and the
like, and in the manufacture of which the defendants are largely
engaged; that the process of manufacture and fuel used are
generally employed in similar establishments ; and that there was
neither a negligent nor wilful infliction of injury upon the plafiAtiff or his property, in the defendants' mode of operating the works.
Whatever injury may have, or shall result to his property from
the defendants' works, by reason of the nuisances complained of,
is such only as is incident to a lawful business, conducted in the
ordinary way, and by no unusual means. Still there may be
injury to the plaintiff; but this of itself- may not .entitle him
to the remedy he seeks. It may not, if ever so clearly established,
be a case in which equity ought to enjoin the defendants in the
use of a material necessary to the successful production of an article of such prime necessity as good iron-especially if it be very
certain that a greater injury would ensue by enjoining them than
would result from a refusal to enjoin. If we were able with certainty to say- that -the use of semi-bituminous coal- in the process
of making good iron by the puddling process was unnecessary,
ind other fuel was equally good and available.; or, that by a
reasonable expenditure of money in the works, all injury might
be avoided, a different case might appear to our minds as chancellors, and we might well say, that the cause of injury should
cease, and that a decree on terms to meet such a contingency
should be made, so as to prevent the injury. But we have not
this case before us. Bituminous, or at least semi-bituminous,
coal, we think, is.necessary in the manufacture of iroin such as.
the business of the defendants requires, and 'whose fabrics the
public requires.
Nor are we shown by testimony or reliable tests of any kind,
that the smoke produced in the puddling process can be consumed,
as it undoubtedly may be in ordinary chimneys, or where produced in furnaces used to propel machinery. "I am personally
cognisant that this may be done, from observation both in this
country and England ; and I have, therefore, read with satisfaction, and entire conviction of its truth the article, from the
London Quarterly for 1866, so largely quoted by the learned
counsel of the appellants ; but I would be v.ery unwilling to act
on that conviction or that theory, any further than to the extent
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to which experiment has gone. I would require very clear 1ro(,f
of the practicability of the application of the principle to cases
dissimilar, or partially so, as puddling-chimneys from common
steam smoke-stacks. The defendants .seem willing to test the
applicability of smoke-consumers to puddling furnaces; and at the
same time express their doubts in a practical shape, by offering
$50,000 for an invention which will consume the smoke of these
puddling-stacks, without impairing the efficiency of the process
of manufacturing iron. However this may be, certain it is, we
are not able to say froin anything shown, that the evil complained of can be remedied by the application of smoke-consumers.'
We do not know what effect their application might have on the
process.
Nor -do we think we should enjoin the defendants
because they might he unwilling to add to the height of their
chimneys, without knowing what effect this would have, or because
they might not be willing to -tear down their establishment and reerect it on Seiman's plan or patent. What effect these remedies
or either of them ought to have on the mind of a chancellor, if
practicable, if the injury complained of were absolutely irreparable, we are not called upon to say, for such is evidently not the
case here, if there be damage, as we shall presently show.
The rule on this subject is well stated iii Gray v. The Ohio
and Pennsylvania Railroad Co., 1 Grant's Cases, thus-"Wfere damages will compensate either the benefits derived or
loss suffered from a nuisance, equity will not int*erfere." See,
also, Hilliard on Injunction 271 ; Adams' Eq. 485 ; Fonblanque's
Eq. 51 ; Story's Eq., § 925, et seq.; Eden bn Injunct. 269.
In Coe v. Lake, 37 N. H. 254, it was said where the bill
prayed an injunction to suppress a nuisance to the plaintiff's land
it might be dismissed on general demurrer for want of equity,
unless it appeared from the subject-matter affected by the alleged
nuisance that thera was*danger of irreparable mischief, or of an
injury, such as could not be adequately compensated in a suit at
law. These and many other authorities to the same effect, some
of which are on the paper-book of the appellees, prove conclusively that, as a general rule, mischief or damage is not irreparable which is susceptible of being compensated in damages. We
have no doubt that an action at law will lie for an injury to property for causes similar to those mentioned in the bill, and if so,
why will not the remedy be adequate in such case, and thus the

362

COMIONWEALTH v. CITY COUNCILS

injury be repaired in damages ? We are not to presume that it
will not be. This would be to impugn the justice of our commonlaw forums without a reason. We think under the circumstances
of the case that the injunction, ought to be refused, and the plaintiff left to his action at law for the recovery of such damages as
he may have sustained, or may sustain.
An error seems somewhat prevalent in portions, at least, of this
Commonwealth, in regard to proceedings-in equity to restrain the
commission of nuisances. It seems to be supposed that, as at
law, whenever a case is made out of wrongful acts on the one
side, and consequent injury on the other, a decree to restrain the
act complained of as certainly follows as a judgment would follow
a verdict in a common-law court. This is a mistake. It is
elementary law, that in equity a decree is never of right, as a
judgment at. law is, but of grace. Hence the chancellor will consider whether h would not do a greater injury by enjoining, than
would result from refusing, and leaving the party to his redress
at the hands of a court and jury. If in conscience the former
should so appear he will refuse to enjoin : Hilton v. Greenville,
1 Or. & Ph' Ch. R. 292; Gray v. The Ohio and;Pennsylvania
Railroad Co., 1 Grant 412.
We think this is a safe rule, and that the case we are considering is within it. With these views, and on full .consideration of
all the testimony in the case, we are of opinion the injunction was
properly refused in the court below; and that the decree dismissing the plaintiff's bili,-with costs, must be affirmed.
Appeal dismissed-at the costs of the appellant."

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
COMMONWEALTIH EX REL. BALLIER v. TTIE COMMON COUNCIL
OF THE CITY OF. PHILADELPHIA.
A tribunal authorized by law to decide upon 'the sufficiency of sureties' for
official duty, cannot p6stpone its decision because the title to the office is elsewhere
disputed.
An officer not commissioned is authorized to enter upon the performance of the
duties upon the certificate of election delivered by the'return judges.

THIs was'a proceeding for a mandamus, to compel the Commnin
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Council of the city of Philadelphia to decide upon the sufficiency
of sureties submitted to them by the relator.
At the general election of October 1867, John F. Ballier was
returned as elected to the office of city commissioner. This office
was created by § 13, Act of February 2d 1854, Pamph. L. 30.
Before entering upon the performance of the duties of said office
it was required that he should give bond "with such sureties as
shall be approved by the councils for the faithful performance of
the duties of said office :" § 4, Act of April 21st 1858, Pamph.
L. 386.
The relator submitted sufficient sureties to the Common Councill
butthat body declined to act.
On the 5th day of February f868, a petition was filed in the
Supreme Court- of Pennsylvania, on which an alternative mandamus was awarded as follows :367.
January 1868.
City and County of Philadelphia. 9s.
The Conimonwealth of Pennsylvanfar
To George W. Madtague et al., members of the Common Council of Philadelphia,
Greeting:
Whereas, John F. Ballier has filed his petition, setting forth
That at the general election in October 1867, the said John F. Ballier was duly
elected by the qualified voters of the city of Philadelphia to the office of city commissioner, for a term commencing on the 1st day of January next succeeding said
election, as appears by the return thereof, filed in the office of the prothonotary of
the Court of Cozhmon Pleas of the county of Philadelphia, and a certificate of
which election was delivered to the said John F. Ballier in accordance with law:
And that, by the fourth section of an Act of the General Assembly, approved
April 21st 1858 (P. L. 386), it is enacted that a'city commissioner shall, before
entering upon the duties of his office, give bond in such amount and with such
sureties as shall be approved by the councils of Philadelphia, for the faithful performance of the duties of said office:
And that, in pursuance to said act, the councils of Philadelphia.,by an ordinance
of May 10th 1858 (p. 200), ordained that the amount of the bond to he given in
such case should be in the sum of $10,000:
And that, in pursuance to the requirements of the law as aforesaid, the said John
F. Ballier submitted to the Common Council certain sureties, whose sufficiency was
approved by the committee of finance in accordance with the rules of said body, but
that the said Common Council refuse to consider the same, or to proceed to decide
thereupon ; and that said action. caused injury'to the said John F. Ballier, and that
he was without any specific remedy in the premises, and praying that a writ of'
vnindamus should issue:
Therefore, wE COMMAND you and each of you, as members of the Common
Council of the city of Philadelphia, to decide according to law, and the usages of
said council, at a session of your body next hereafter occurring, upon the sufficiency
- of the sureties of the said John F. Ballier, submitted by him for the faithful per-
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formance of the duties of the office of city commissioner; or the cause wherefore to
show unto us, why you should not, in answer to this writ, on Saturday, the 15th
day of February 1868, and hereof fail not.

The respondents filed a return setting forth "that by a petition
of fifty citizens and qualified electors filed in the Common Pleas
of the county of Philadelphia on the 18th day of October 1867,
in accordance with § 35 of the Act of February 2d 1854, Pamph.
L. 28, complaint was made of ' a false return and undue election
for the office of city commissioner,' and that the proceeding upon
s.aid petition was still pending, and that this was a sufficient
excuse for a non-compliance with said writ.
To this return the relator demurred and prayed that a peremptory mandamus issue.
.David W. Sellers and Isaac Gerhat, for the relator, urged
that it was the duty of the defendants to proceed with the decision of the sufficiency of the sureties: Lamb v. Lynd, 8 Wright

336.

Where an officer is elected by the people, the summing up and
certificate of the return judges determine in the first instance the
title to the office. If error or. fraud is alleged a judicial tribunal
mustdetermine that question in the usual way, but meanwhile the
duties of theoffice must be performed, and by the holder of the
primdfacie title: -Ewingv. Thompson, 7 Wright 372.
If secarities must be approved by the court, the court cannot
suspend its action although at the very time the contest for the
office may be progressing before it: In re Securities, 4 Phila.
Rep. 370. :Afortiori is the duty to be performed by a municipal.
body having no power to decide upon the title to, the office.
James Lynd, City Solicitori contrd.
February 21st 1868.
PER CURIAM.-Until the title of the r6lator -is avoided it is
good against all. He is authorized to enter upon the performance
of the duties of the office, and the Common Council cannot delay
him, by declining to approve his sureties, if sufficient. A pend.
ing contest is nothing to this question. Let a peremptory man
damus issue as prayed for.

UNITED STATES v. 33 BARRELS.

United States District Court, District of Massaclusetts.
UNITED STATES v. THIRTY-THREE BARRELS OF DISTILLED
SPIRITS ET AL.
The words " personal property" in the 48th section of the Internal Revenue Act
of 1864, as amended by the Act of 1866, do not include all the personal property
found in the same building where the still and illicitly-distilled spirits were found,
and in the possession, custody, and control of the same person who had control
thereof, but must be confined to the tools, implements, and instrunients that had
been or could be used in connection with the distillation of spirits in the building.

THIS was an information against the contents of a, four-story

building on Central Wharf, in the city of Boston. There was a
still in the attic of the building, a grocery store on the first floor,
where liquors were sold at retail, and on the second and thirdfloors there were barrels, chemicals, and other articles, such as
might be used in the manufacture of spirits: The contents of the
grocery store, excepting cdrtain barrels of liquors, were claimed
by John Lombard. At the trial before a jury, the government
contended that the whole was one establishment, and that the grocery store was used only for purposes of concealment in carrying
on the illicit distillation in the attic, and that the whole was- forjfeited to the United States. The jury condemned the whole property. A motion for a new trial and a motion for an arrest of
judgmieht wer made by the claimant.
W. A. Field, for th' United States..
.L. S. Dabney, for claimants.
LOWELL, J.-Iu this case there is a m6tion for a new trial on
the ground that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence,
and a motion in arrest of judgment. The information, as
amended, alleges in the 5th count that certain distilled- spirits
were found at No. 45 Central Wharf, Boston, in the posdession,
custody, and control of one John Lombard, for the purpose of
being sold by him in fraud of the revenue laws; that two hogsheads of molasses were found at the same place in the possession
of said Lombard, and were raw mate'rials which he intended to
I We are indebted for this case to the "Internal Revenue Record."-Ei). Am.
LAW REG.
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manufacture into distilled spirits, for the purpose of fraudulently
selling the same, and evading the taxes thereon, and that the
other goods, wares, merchandise, and property seized, which
appear to form the stock, furniture, and fixtures of a retail dealer
in liquors and groceries, were.tools, implements, instruments, and:
personal property found at the same time and in the same building
with the spirits and the molasses, and in the possession, custody,
and control of the said Lombard.
The other amended counts differ from the 5th count, in sub
stance, only as to the person in whom the custody is alleged
tobe.
The law under which the information is brought is § 48 of the
Act of 1864, ch. 173, 13 Stat. 240, as amended by the Act of
1866, ch. 184, 14 Stat. 111. As the act stood at first, all goods,
&c, on which duties are imposed which shall be found in the possession, &c.j of any person for the purpose of being sold or
removed in fraua of the internal revenue laws, may be seized and
shall be forfeited, and so of raw materials intended to be manufactured for the purpose of being so sold, and also all tools, implements, instruments, and personal property whatsoever, in the place
or building, or within any yard or enclosure where such articles
are found, and intended to be used. by them (i..e., the persons
before mentioned), in the manufacture of such raw materials.
The new statute amends the phraseology of this section in several
other particulars without perhaps much variation of the meanihg,
but omits altogether the qualifications of intended use of the tools,
implements, instruments, and personal property, and upon a literal
interpretation might seem to subject to seizure and forfeiture a1l
goods and chattels and other things coming within the tery general description of personal property, to whomsoever it may belong,
if found in the same building, including out-buildings, yard, &c.,
with the offending goods.
It is impossible to believe that any such sweeping condemnation
is intended to be passed, founded upon mere proximity in place,
upon the goods of all .persons innocent and guilty. In its application to a city or other busy place, where the same building Is
divided into numerous tenements, shops, offices, counting:houses,
and warerooms, all being often found under one roof, and each
occupied by a different tenant, the operatipn of such a law.would
work the most enormous and unheard-of injustice. To take a
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single example, the money in the vaults of any bank might. be
forfeited for the fault of some petty trader in the attic of the
banking-house. It is a general principle of law as well as of
natural justice, that statutes will not be understood to forfeit pro.
perty except for the fault of the owner or his agents, general or
special, unless such a construction is unavoidable. See Peisch v.
Ware, 4 Cranch 347; F-reeman v. 403 Casks Gunpowder,
Thacher Grim. Gases 14.
This information dbes indeed allege that the personal property
snught to be confiscated was in the possession or under the control of the wrongdoer. But even if the statute be limited in that
way, it will be most arbitrary and unjust in its operation,: for the
puiifshment will bdar no sort of necessary relation to the offence..
The crime is punished by the very same section with a fine of
$5000, or double the amount of the tax; but this forfeiture may
be indeffnihtely.greater than either. Bui the more valid reason
against this construction is, that nothing in the statute itself points
to the possession or control of this personal property as deciding
its status, but .only and solely the place where it is found. A
forfeiture of the goods of the same owner, found with the unlawful goods, is not without precedent in revenue laws, and I was at
first disposed to believe that such was the meaning of this statute,but upon a more careful inquiry, I am satisfied that the construction presently to be mentioned, is more consistent with the words
of the law. By reason and analogy, as well as by the context,
we find that some real connection with the fraud is intended to be
attached to the property that is liable-to seizure. The untaxed.
articles and the raw materials intended t6 .be manufactured, are
the principal things, and the tools, implements, instruments, and
personal property, are only the connected- incidents. I am of
opinion that by the familiar rule of construction, sometimes cited
noscitur a sociis, we must restrict the general words personal property, by the more particular and immediately preceding words,
tools, implements, and instruments. Such a restriction hag been
adopted in many well-considered cases. Thus, where it was
enacted that no tradesman, artificer, workman, laborer, or other
person whatsoever, should do or exercise any worldly labor, business, or work of their ordinary callings upon the Lord's day, the
Court of King's Bench held unanimously that this did not include
drivers of stage-coaches: Sandiman v. Breach, 7 B. & C. 96.
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So any artificer, calico printer, handicraftsman, miner, collier,
pitman, keelman, glassman, potter, laborer, or other person who
shall contract with any person whomsoev.er, for any time or times,
does not include domestic servants: .Kitchen v. Shaw, 7 A. & E.
729, 1 N. & P. 791.
Other examples of a restricted construction of the general
words of a statute- are Rex v. Manciester Waterworks, 1 B. & C.
680; Rex v. Mosely, 2 Id. 226; Coolidge v. Williams, 4 Mass.
140 ; Sprague v. Birdsall, 2 Cow. 419. And in the construction
of deeds and wills, it is not unusual to confine general expressions
by a regard to the context. Thus, "all my estate of what kind
soever," being connectedwith words referring only to chattels,
was held not to pass real estate': Sanderson v. Dobson,I Exch.
141.
In the present case the words, "1tools, implements, and instruments," are carelessly used, and are. mere surplusage, and the
general words ".personal property," are intended to include them.
Why mention tools and implements if everything but real estate
is to be conifiseated ? And if any specification is desired, why
not specify the property much more important and more likely to
be found in- such a connection, namely, the stock in trade, notes,
money, &c.; before the general words ? It cannot be doubted
that the tools, implements, and instruments here forfeited, are
those with which the unlawful business is carried on; and if that
is so, does not their enumeration exclude all other tools, implements, and instruments ? If a carpenter's tools, a'.*.surgeon's
instruments, or a dressmaker's sewing-machine are found in a distillery, can they be forfeited as tools, implements, 'and instruments ? If not, and if they are tools -and nothing else, how can
they be swept in as "personal property ?" It must be on the
very ground that they are not connected with the fraud, and then
the statute will read thus, "all tools, implements,-and instruments
of the unlawful business shall be forfeited together with all other
tools, implements, instruments, and personal property which have
no such connection." No fair, sensible, or reasonable construction can be given to-the particular words, without supplying t le
qualification which I have adopted; and when you have suapplied
that, it naturally restricts the operation of the more general words
which follow, and the statute is read as forfeiting the tools, implements, instruments, and personal property connected with the
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illegai business, and found within the building, yard, or enclosure where that business is carried on. This construction gives
effect to all the language, because there are often many things
connected with a trade or manufacture which are not properly
described as either tools, implements, or instruments,-as for example fuel, fixtures, &c.
This construction entirely relieves the difficulty concerning the
place or building, yard and enclosure, because it is reasonable
that all things which are part of the unlawful business which are
found withiri the same enclosure, whether inside or outside of the
building, should be forfeited, and that all articles appropriate to
such business which are so found, should be primd facie presumed
to be connected with the fraud. This interpretation makes the'
whole law just, harmonious, and in telligiblej
New trial granted

United States Circuit Court, Eastern -Districtof New York.
THE UNITED STATES'v. QUANTITY OF RAGS, ETC.
The words "personal property" in section 48 of the Internal Rerenue Act, for-feiting property used in illicit distilling, include all the property in the building
where the still or spirits are found, whether of a nature to be used in the distillation
of spirits or not.
What may be considered within the same building, yard, or enclosure.

This was an action under the 48th section of the Internal Revenue Law, to forfeit certain personal property, upon the following
state of facts
One Young owned a brick house situated upon the part of a
city lot; against the rear wall of which a stable had been formerly
erected. The adjoining lot was also owned by Young, and had
been covered with a wooden building having wide doors at each
end constructed and used for a livery stable. The rear of both
lots was enclosed together by a single fence across the two, thus
forming one enclosure, from which the only access to the street
for vehicles was through the livery stable ; a small gate opened
from the yard in the rear of the lots, and a swinging door had
been constructed opening from the rear stable building to the
1 See the next case.
VOL. XVI.=-24
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brick house in front; another door opened from the side of the
brick house into the livery stable. Young occupied the front
brick building as a junk-shop, and leased -the livery stable to one
Sherman for a livery stable, and since that he leased the rear
stable to other parties. It appeared that the rear doors of the
livery stable were. on Thursday prior to the seizure, found
fastenei by a spring lock capable of being opened without a key;
the snow in the rear then gave evidence of the passing of persons
from the livery stable to the rear stable, -and in the rear stable
was an illicit still with mash in fermentation; on Friday the still
was in operation ; on Saturday night the officers made a descent
upon the place. The lock upon the rear door of the stable was
found to have been changed. The distillery was then in full
operation under the care of two men both of whom fled through
the swinging door into the junk-shop, and thence to the street;
where one Was .arrested. No claim was interposed for the
distillery property, but Young claimed the personal property
seized in the'junk-shop, and Sherman the horses, &c., seized in the
livery stable. Both claimants denied any knowledge of the existence of a still in the rear stable. There was evidence that the
smell of distillation in the rear building would 'necessarily be
detected throughout the. whole place. There was no evidence
,that either of them was interested in the still. Upon a motion to
direct a verdict 'for the government,
BENEDICT, J., ruled that under section 48 of the Internal
Revenue Law, the juxtaposition of the property proceeded against
in the same. place, or within the same enclosure with the illi.it
still, was sufficient to forfeit it; provided the owners of the property knew of the existence of the illicit still in the rear stable,
and that under the evidence in the case the jury would not be
warranted in finding that the existence of the 'illicit still was
unknown to the owner of the place and the keeper of the livery
"stable. A verdict was accordingly directed in favor of the
government.
The difficulties in the interpretation
of a system of laws so entirely new in'
this country as the Internal Revenue
Acts, are very strikingly shown in the
two foregoing cases, in which two courts
of equal authority, each composed of a

judge of great learning and exp.erienc,
have come to precisely opposite conclusions upon one of the most important
sections in the law.
The language of the Act of 1864 is,
"all tools, implements, instruments,

MATTER OF MILNER.
and personal property whatsoever, in propdrty whatsoever," taken literally,
the place or building, or within any yard would certainly include the horses in the
or enr'lsure where such articles .
livery stable as well as the property in
-ball he found."
the junk-shop, but the court would seem
It will be observed that, although it to have given a very liberal construction
w:. no( proved by the testimonT in the to so severe and penal an act, in holding
la-t ca-e, Sherman or Young were inter- that the stable and shop, under the cirer ,, in, or knew of the existence of the cumstances, were included "in the place
still, except from surroupding circum- or building, or within the yard or enstances, the court held the personal pro- closure." On'the other hand, the Disperry in the buildings, which included trict Court in Massachusetts,'by taking
horses, carriages, harness, &c., in the* the words "all personal property" as
stable belonging to Sherman, and the merely in pari materia with tools and
property in the junk-slhop belonging to implements capable of being used-in the
Young, were forfeited. In other words, *illegal manufacture, has essentially rethe juxtaposition and the suspicious cir- duced the severity of the act, and per
cumstances of the.property proceeded haps in practice may be found to have
agamnst within the adjoining buildings to materially impaired its efficiency. The
the Qtill,weresuffi eient to forfeit it. No different points to which the 'attention of
doubt appears to have been suggested as the two courts was directed may fairly
to the propriety of extending the for- account forthe difference of construction,
feiture to goods .not in their nature but the section itself is too important,
adapted. to the unlawful manufacture, anT the interests involved too large, to
and the attention of the court was di- be long without an authoritative exposirected chiefly, if not entirely, to 'the tion, audwe presume a, case will shortly
extent of space covered by the words find. its way to the. Supreme Court, the
9"in the place or building, or within any ultimate tribunal to set the matter at
yarc ot enclosure," &c. The expression rest.
J_ F..B.
of the act "all ..
. personal

District' Court of the United States, NPorthern District -of
Georgia.
MATTER OF JONATHAN J. MILNER, A BANKRUPT.
A promissory note, the consideration of which was a loan of Confederate money,
is not provable as a claim in bankruptcy against the makerPer ERSKINE, J. : Confederate treasury notes were not bills oferedit within the
prohibition of the Constitution of the United States ; but were illegal, because
issued by a pretended and revolutionary government set up within the limits of the
United States.

IN 1863 John Neal loaned $2500, in "Confederate

treasury

notes," to Milner, the bankrupt, for which amount he made his
promissory note to Neal. Subsequently, Neal gave this note to
his son-in-law in trust for minor children of his daughter.
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The trustee sought to prove this claim against the estate of the
bankrupt. Counsel for the latter objected: First, because the
consideration for the contract was Confederate treasury notes;
secondly, because these notes were borrowed for the purpose of
hiring a substitute to serve iiithe Confederate army, with the
knowledge of Neal- and that the notes were so appropriated, and
the substitute hired therewith did go into the said army.'
Evidence being heard on these points, the register rejected the
claim, and the proceedings were certified to the court. The conclusion at which the register arriVed was approved by the court,
but, on petition, a reheariiig was had before the register on the
ground that the evidence did not warrant the conclusion that Neal
knew the purpose for which the money was borrowed. The register, however, adhered to his former opinion, and it was again
certified to the court.
ERSINE, J.-From the views which I entertain of the legal
principles involved in this proceeding, it is not essential to an
approval or disapproval of the conclusion at which the register
arrived, that these Confederate treasury notes., or. any portion of
them, were used to procure a substitute to serve in the Confede.
rate army, or that they were, employed for any other purpose.
The register holds, as he held 't first, that the contract was illegal
and vbid; and this result I approve and affirm: But I do.not
concur with him in one of the principal .reasons advanced for his
decision; and, which -reason is more prominently argued in his
first written opinion than in his last, namely, that these'notes were
bills of credit within the sense of that term, as understood in the
Constitution. He said- " Art. 1, sec. 10, clause 1, of the Constitution declares, among other things, that I no state shall enter
into any confederation,' or ' emit bills of credit.' It follows, then,
that the confederation styled the Southern Confederacy, was
•entered into by the several states of which it was composed, in
direct violation of an express provision of the supreme law of the
land. As no state can constitutionally emit bills of credit,' it
follows,' as a matter of course, that no confederation of states cah
do so without bidding defiance to the' Constitution. The issuance
'of Confederate treasury notes wasrnot only an illegal act within
itself, but was doubly illegal, having been done "by an illegal
confederation."
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"No state shall enter into any treaty, alliance, ox confederation ; grant letters of marque and reprisal ; coin money ; emit bills
of credit," &c. : Const. U. S. Art. 1, See. 10, p. 1.
No disquisition on the origin of bills of credit, or history of
their rise-and progress, or of their fall, under the inhibition just
cited, would aid in the determination of this case. Therefore I
will but remark, that the great minds who framed the Constitution were, from recent experience, aware of the blighting effect
on the domestic and foreign commerce of the states, and on the
welfare of the whole country, which flbwed from the almost indiscriminate issuing of these bills by the colonies, and afterwards by
the states, as a ciiculating medium or as money among the people, to suffer its perpetuation, or to longer tolerate, it to the states
-and time has proven the wisdom of their statesmanship.
So far as I have been able to ascertain, all paper answering to
bills of credit put forth during the war of Independence, were
promises to pay. But, be this so" or not, the Supreme Court of
the United States, in Craig et al. v. The- State of Missouri, 4
Peters- 410, held, that a paper currency emitted by a state, and
receivable in discharge of all debts and taxes due the state, and
of all salaries and fees of office, &c., &c.-and pledging the faith
and funds of the state for the redemption of -these paper issues-was within the constitutional prohibition.
The same 66urt, in Briscoe v. The Bank of the Commonwealth
of Kentucky, 11 Peters -258, gave the following compyehensive
definition of a bill of credit: " The definition, then; which does
include all classes of bills of credit emitted by the colonies, or
states, is a paper issued -by 'the sovereign power, containing' a
pledge of its faith, and designed to eirculat& as money."
Taking this definition as imparted by the highest judicial tribunal in the land, it will conduct to a correct conclusion the
endeavor to ascertain whether these treasury notes or bills, issued
by the so-called Confederate States, fall within it.
Although it is declared that no state shall emit bills of credit;
yet if two or more of the states ally themselves or 'confederate
together, and on their faith and credit issue these bills, I apprehend, the inhibition would apply with a force equally as direct
and controlling against the allied or confederated states as against
a single one.
Here is a copy of one of these treasury notes
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"Fundable in eight per cent. stock or bonds of the Confederate
States. Six months after the ratificati.on of a treaty of peace
between the Confederate States and the United States, the Con.
federate States of America will pay five dollars to bearer.
Richmond, September 2d 1861
".Receivable in payment -of all dues, except export duties."
Then follow the names of a register and treasurer.
One decision-and only one-on this subject has been brought
to my notice ; that is the case of Bank of Tennessee v. Union
Bank of Louisiana, lately tried before Judge DURELL, and a
jury, in the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern
District of Louisiana, and published in the American Law Review
for January, 1868. The judge is there reported to have said, in
his charge to the jury, "that confederate treasury notes issued
by said government, and circulated as money, were bills of credit
within the meaning of the Constitution ; and therefore an unlawful
issue." The views which present themselves to my mind do not
terminate in accord with the opinion expressed by that learned
and able judge. •
During tre years 1860 and 1861, South Carolina, Georgia, 4nd
other states, by similar modes, called on the people to send delegates to meet in.convention.- Accordingly, these conventions
assembled, and each passed an ordinance of secession, as it is
generally termed, by which ceremony, these convbntions sever-ally
adventured to withdraw the states from.the Federal Union, and
to release the people from their subjection to the laws of the land,
and their allegiance to the Nation. The constitutional state
governments were 'verthrown, and superseded by spurious and
revolutionary governments. The setting up of a pretended central,
or general government' styled (The Confederate States of
America" followed; and, soon thereafter, open rebellion, and
war of portentous magnitude burst upon the nation: Vide The
Prize Cases, 2 Black 635, and Shortridge.v. Mason, United
States Circuit Court, District of North Carolina: 2 Am. Law
Review 95.!

"

In the seceded stated (so called) the sovereign authority being
for the time displaced, consequently, there ceased to'be, within
any of them, a government under the Constitution of the United
States. Then, can it be said that the- usurping power could
pledge the -faith of the state by a public law, or otherwise, for
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the payment of the treasury notes issued by the so-called Cbnfederate States of America ? Or could this pretended general
government bind any of those states for the redemption of these
notes ?
But these Confederate treasury notes or bills do not pretend to
have been emitted by a state, or a combination of states of the
Union; nor can it be inferred from indicia found upon them,nor can their recondite history show-that they emanated from
the sovereign power, and on the faith of any of the states. And
thus it will be seen, that they did not .possess the characteristic
attributes of bills of credit, in accordance with the definition of
the Supreme Court of the United States ; they did not issue by
virtue of the sovereignty of the siate, nor did they rest for their'
currency on the faith of the state pledged by a public law: Darrington et al. v. State Bankc of Alabama, 13 How. 12.
Notwithstanding these notes or bills were not, in my judgment,
bills of credit.within the prohibition contained in the tenth section of the first article of the constitution ; yet they were none
the less illegal; they were issued by a pretended government,
organized in the name of certain states, by subjects and citizens
of the United States, and who, at the very time, were in rebellion
against their rightful government, and whose design and object
was to " dismember and destroy it :" The JPrize Cases.-S ortridge v. Mason, 8upra.
It may not be wholly unimportant to remark, that it is a wellestablished doctrine of the courts, that a wide distinction exists
between an executed and an executory contract. In the former,
they will not, as a general rule, interfere between the parties, to
set the contract aside, but will leave them where they placed
themselves ; and this, too, notwithstanding the contract be, in
part, or in whole, founded on an illegal consideration. And one
owning property may-U-if no fraud be put upon lim, and no misrepresentation or circumvention or covin enter into the transac.
tion-alienate it-absolutely, for what currency or thing he
pleases, or even give it away. But an executory contract, like
this claim of Bailey, the trustee, against the assets of the bankrupt Milner, will not be enforced. The principles of law directly
applicable to executory contracts, based upon, illegality, were
long since determined by the courts, both in England and in this
sountry. One case only will be referred to. The doctrine, as

